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“THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS”
AND TWO ARGUMENTS FOR INTERACTIONISM
Vadim V. Vasilyev

The paper begins with a restatement of Chalmers’s “hard problem of consciousness.” It is suggested that an interactionist approach is one of the possible solutions of this problem. Some fresh arguments against the identity
theory and epiphenomenalism as main rivals of interactionism are developed. One of these arguments has among its corollaries a denial of local supervenience, although not of the causal closure principle. As a result of these
considerations a version of “local interactionism” (compatible with causal
closure) is proposed. It is argued that local interactionism may offer a fruitful
path for resolving the “hard problem.”

In 1994 the more or less routine discussions on the mind-body problem
were thrown into an uproar by David Chalmers. In his talk at the University of Arizona conference “Toward a Science of Consciousness,” he
made a distinction between “easy problems of consciousness,” dealing
scientifically with psychological mechanisms, and “the hard problem
of consciousness.”1 The hard problem of consciousness is the question:
Why and how does brain activity give rise to consciousness?2 One can
bracket the “how” part of the question and give its deepest “why” part a
more neutral expression: Why is brain activity accompanied by subjective
experience?3 There have been many responses to this question, but now,
after fifteen years of discussion, there has emerged a kind of consensus:
while the hard problem looks like a philosophical question, in fact it is
hardly possible to solve this problem by philosophical conceptual means,
and if it can be solved at all, the solution will come from the side of neuroscience, the progress of which strikes our imagination.4
1
David told me in a personal communication that, as far as he remembered, he began using
this distinction in his Seminar on Consciousness at Washington University “in late 1993.”
2
Cf. D. J. Chalmers, “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness
Studies 2 (1995), pp. 200–219.
3
See D. J. Chalmers, Consciousness and Cognition (unpublished, 1990), available at http://
consc.net/papers/c-and-c.html.
4
Not everyone would agree that we have such a consensus. Chalmers, for example, believes it would be better to avoid such sociological remarks. Maybe we should ask experimental philosophers indeed. Still, I believe, most analytic philosophers these days would
give the kind of answer I have sketched (as is certainly suggested by their preoccupation
with experimental data in talking about consciousness). Pessimists, like C. McGinn in The
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I think, however, that this is a rather strange consensus, because it is
possible to give quite a promising philosophical explanation of the fact
that brain activity is accompanied by subjective experience with qualia.
According to this explanation, the brain simply could not work, as it usually works, without subjective experience—it could not produce behavior
of the sort that normal human beings demonstrate in their ordinary lives.
Now, we should keep in mind that there are three ways in which one
might hold that the brain could not work, as it usually works, without
subjective experience. The first way would occur if subjective experiences
were a condition of the very existence or efficacy of the physical events
making up brain activity. This is conceivable, for example, if qualia are
the substantial basis of physical properties. The attempt to solve the hard
problem in such a way was made by Chalmers in his 1996 book The Conscious Mind, but his recent papers seem to abandon this approach. And it
is understandable why: it is a highly speculative road, based on a bizarre
ontological model, lacking arguments in its favor. Among other things, it
is not clear why physical properties need any basis. Chalmers referred to
Bertrand Russell’s idea that our knowledge about matter is a knowledge
of relations only, and relations presuppose the things that relate to each
other. But no one has yet proven that physical reality as we know it is just
a complex of relations. It is no surprise that almost nobody among major
philosophers likes this solution.5
The second way in which subjective experience might be necessary
for brain activity derives from the identity theory. According to this
well-known theory, originating in works of U. Place, H. Feigl, and J. J.
C. Smart, so-called subjective experience is identical with physical processes in the brain, and thereby is necessary for its normal activity. Since
its presentation fifty years ago this theory has been sharply criticized
from many angles. I am quite convinced by that criticism, especially by
objections to this theory proposed by S. Kripke, D. Chalmers, and M.
McKinsey.6 To their semantic arguments I would add another one, of a
different kind: the basic proposition of the identity theory, if we understand this proposition as a statement about the ontological identity of
qualia and physical processes in the brain, does not allow verification,
in contrast, say, to the thesis of the identity of the Morning Star and
the Evening Star. It might be possible to verify a thesis of a correlation
Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World (New York: Basic Books, 1999), and
conceptualists, like Chalmers, do not represent the mainstream view.
5
One of the exceptions is Gregg Rosenberg, who defends a similar view in his A Place for
Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004). See also E. Holman, “Panpsychism, Physicalism, Neutral Monism and the Russellian Theory of Mind,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 15.5 (2008), pp. 48–67.
6
S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980);
D. J. Chalmers, “The Two-dimensional Argument against Materialism,” The Character of
Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming); M. McKinsey, “Refutation of Qualia-physicalism,” Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry, ed. M.
O’Rourke and C. Washington (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 469–498.
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between physical processes and some qualitative experiences, but proponents of identity theory (except perhaps Ullin Place) make a distinction
between correlation and identity. If the identity theory cannot be verified, it should be rejected. And the common suggestion that the identity
theory is an example of “inference to the best explanation” is of no help.
Such inferences can make sense only when it is possible to verify them.
Otherwise they lead to absurdity. Let us imagine, for example, that we
have found a curious anomaly: two clocks of a different construction in
different parts of the world are in exact synchrony with each other. We
have no idea how this is possible. So what? Should we infer to the “best
explanation,” saying that these two clocks are in reality just one clock,
that is, identical? But we cannot even imagine how they could be a single
clock, except in a figurative sense. As we have no method of verification
of the “clocks identity theory,” this theory should be unacceptable, as it
surely is. But the very same considerations can be applied to the mindbrain identity theory.7
Thus, if we still want to solve the hard problem of consciousness by
appeal to the necessity of qualitative mental properties or states for our
brain activity, we seem to have no choice but to turn to the third way
in which this necessity might arise. According to this way, qualia are
ontologically distinct from physical properties but have a real influence
on physical processes in the brain. This is none other than interactionism (but not necessarily substance interactionism; I think we have more
reasons to accept a kind of emergent interactionism). Interactionism is
not a very popular position among analytic philosophers, and the reason is fear that it leads to violating the causal closure principle, which,
as many believe, is a foundation of a contemporary physics. I hope that
we can avoid such violation, and I will return to this topic at the end of
the paper.
However, now I want to note that, if we set aside the identity theory,
it looks like the only serious alternative to the preceding kind of interactionism is epiphenomenalism, a theory according to which our qualitative
mental states are ontologically distinct from physical reality but have no
influence on physical processes. In recent times there have been a few attempts to destroy epiphenomenalism. The main goal of the present paper
is to survey these attempts briefly, to show that they don’t provide conclusive arguments against epiphenomenalism, and to supplement them with
two other arguments. One of these two arguments is only relatively new,
although I hope to strengthen it here. But the other argument is quite new
and, I hope, conclusive. In the course of offering this second argument, I
7
Common criticism of the verification principle misses the point in our case. It seems to
be true that when we talk about some abstract propositions, the verification principle does
not work, as indicated by S. Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1: The
Dawn of Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 289–291. But in our case
the proposition in question is a factual one, and no one, as far as I know, has managed to
show that this principle does not work with propositions of such a kind.
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will also give reasons for accepting the interactionist position about qualia
that I have mentioned above.
1
If we try to sum up the current arguments against epiphenomenalism we
notice that they can be divided into two groups: (1) arguments from common sense, and (2) more special philosophical arguments. The argument
from common sense usually takes this form: ordinary experience shows
us that our qualitative mental states, such as pains or desires,8 play an
important role in the production of our behavior.9 If, say, I want a drink
of water, then it seems obvious that my subsequent behavior through
which I satisfy this desire is in some sense determined by it. However,
the epiphenomenalist can easily avoid this objection by noting that our
ordinary experience shows only a correlation between mental states and
behavior. But correlation is not yet causation. It is possible that the real
causes of my behavior are some neuronal processes, hidden from ordinary experience. They produce not only the behavior, but epiphenomenal
mental states as well. And, as real causes are not directly available to us,
we take these epiphenomenal states for the real causes of the behavior.
But this is just an illusion. And it is not common sense which produces
this illusion. Rather it is produced by philosophers who misinterpret the
common-sense attitude.
For a long time the main special philosophical argument against epiphenomenalism was an argument from evolutionary theory.10 It goes as
follows: if qualitative mental states, or consciousness, were not causally efficacious, then they could not play an adaptive role and be under pressure
of natural selection; and so they could not evolve at all. This argument,
however, presupposes that all enduring phenotypic traits have a positive
adaptive value and cannot be adaptively neutral. But this presupposition
does not follow from the theory of evolution. Let us suppose that trait A
has a positive adaptive value but that the mutation as a result of which
it originates produces another neutral trait B as well. In such a case we
would have a neutral enduring phenotypic trait. And consciousness very
well could have been such a neutral trait, connected with adaptive behavioral patterns. So it seems this argument also fails.
In recent decades there has also emerged an epistemological argument
against epiphenomenalism:11 if consciousness does not affect behavior,
8
It goes without saying that desires can be interpreted as behavioral dispositions. I believe, however, that they (as well as other conscious mental states) also have a qualitative
side. Cf. J. R. Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004),
p. 134.
9
See, for example, R. Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997), p. 1.
10
In recent times this Jamesian argument has been pushed forward by William Hasker,
The Emergent Self (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
11
It is not clear who invented this kind of argument. Recently, it has been vigorously
defended by A. Elitzur. See, for example, A. Elitzur, “Consciousness Makes a Difference: A
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then our reasonings about consciousness do not depend on its existence.
The knowledge expressed in such reasonings is not derived from consciousness and its properties. Correspondingly, this knowledge is not a
knowledge about consciousness. And if this is so, then, assuming the truth
of epiphenomenalism, we can reasonably doubt that we can know anything about consciousness. Or, rather, if epiphenomenalism is true, then
our consciousness should be something totally unknowable. But, as a matter of fact, we know something about consciousness, and this fact means
that consciousness must have a real influence on our behavior. Defenders
of epiphenomenalism (such as D. Chalmers),12 however, respond13 that
this argument is based on the so-called causal theory of knowledge: in
order to know something about any object I should have been affected by
it. As consciousness is causally impotent it is impossible to know about
it. But why should we believe in the universality of the causal theory of
knowledge? How can we exclude the possibility that some things could
be known immediately? And if we cannot eliminate that possibility, as
well as the possibility that consciousness is such an object of immediate
knowledge,14 then the epistemological argument against epiphenomenalism loses its force.
2
Given the failure of the preceding arguments against epiphenomenalism,
we might at this point conclude that epiphenomenalism is immune to any
conceptual objections.15 But I don’t think so. And now I am going to provide such objections. I begin with another argument from common sense.
One of our common-sense attitudes is a belief in the reality of other minds.
Is this attitude compatible with epiphenomenalism? I infer the existence
of other minds on the basis of the similarity of my behavior to the behavior of other beings. My behavior is accompanied by subjective experience,
and, if I see a similar behavior, I conclude that the being which behaves
Reluctant Dualist’s Confession,” Irreducibly Conscious, ed. A. Batthyany, D. Constant, and A.
Elitzur, (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, forthcoming), where he sums up his ideas
on this topic.
12
Chalmers is not an epiphenomenalist. Still, he believes that epiphenomenalism can be
saved from criticism and that it has no crucial logical flaws. See Chalmers, The Conscious
Mind, p. 160.
13
Ibid., p. 196.
14
Robert Kirk, Zombies and Consciousness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005) attempts to
show that this line of defence is flawed; I do not think, however, that he succeeds in this attempt. His argument is based on an odd thought experiment about a zombie with pictures
on the soles of his feet, which are exactly parallel and analogous to Kirk’s visual qualia. Then
he concludes that as there obviously could not be an “epistemic intimacy” as regards those
pictures, the same is true about qualia. I think this argument is a non-starter, because I see
no reasons to accept such an analogy: qualia, in contrast to “sole-pictures,” incorporate some
relation to a subject.
15
I set aside experimental objections, if there are any: in fact, with Libet’s famous data at
hand, an epiphenomenalist could easily disarm them. See B. Libet, Mind Time: The Temporal
Factor in Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
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in such a way also has a subjective experience, that is, consciousness or
mind. But epiphenomenalism denies the causal connection between behavior and consciousness. And if it were right in this denial, it seems I
would have no reason to admit the existence of other minds. Of course, I
would see that the behavior of other beings is similar to my behavior. But
so what? They could behave in such a way even without consciousness.
Why indeed should I assume they have subjective experience?
Of course, some epiphenomenalists would say that in reality they
do not deny any connection between consciousness and behavior. They
would insist that the very same processes in the brain which produce
behavior produce our epiphenomenal consciousness as well. So while
our consciousness has no influence on our behavior, the lack of consciousness would mean the lack of its neuronal basis and some changes
in behavior. But on such a view, how could we know that our epiphenomenal consciousness is produced by the very same brain activity that
produces our particular behavior? From the position of common sense,
we cannot refer to any experimental scientific data. The only way left is
to refer to some simplicity considerations. And some partisans of epiphenomenalism in fact appeal to such considerations. They say that a
possible world in which my epiphenomenal consciousness is produced
by brain activity distinct from the brain activity producing my specifically human behavior, and where only my behavior might be accompanied by subjective experience, while other human and non-human
animals might be simply zombies, would be much less uniform than our
world where we assume a systematic correlation between a certain kind
of behavior and consciousness.
Since simplicity considerations originate in common sense, it seems that
even if we accept epiphenomenalism, we can still retain the idea of the existence of other minds. Still, I am sure this is the wrong line of argument
to follow. I am not going to deny that simplicity considerations originate
in common sense. But my point is that, in fact, the world in which only
I am epiphenomenally conscious would be much more simple than the
“more uniform” world replete with epiphenomenal minds. Indeed, this
second world shows us a classic example of multiplying essences without
any necessity.16 I have no need to postulate the reality of other epiphenomenal minds: it would be a waste of ontological material, as by definition
they must be impotent. At best I could adopt the “intentional stance” (à
la Dennett) toward other human beings and non-human animals, because
it would help to predict their behavior—without making any ontological
commitments to actual intentional states in these beings. (We make no ontological commitments to computers’ having intentional states of different
kinds when, for example, we play chess with them.)
16
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, and W. S. Robinson (in his comprehensive entry on epiphenomenalism, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism) discuss this topic but
do not pay due attention to this point.
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So we see that epiphenomenalism concerning my own consciousness
leads to the zombification of other people and animals. As this zombification contradicts common sense, epiphenomenalism is incompatible with
common sense.
And the conclusion that epiphenomenalism must fail can be strengthened with the help of another argument. This second—special philosophical—argument is based on three premises. Each of these premises looks
quite unproblematic. The first premise is that identical (from the qualitative side) events can have different causes. This point is a commonplace.
For example, the same rise in stock markets can be caused by different
factors; you could break a cup in the same way with your left hand or
with your right hand, etc. Speaking abstractly, any event is something like
a vector, which can be considered as a sum of other vectors. And it is obvious that different components (in our case different components of a complex cause) can bring about the same resultant. The second premise is also
quite obvious, or so it seems. It notes that the memories belonging to human beings reflect or represent their past lives, their individual histories,
and, in general, these memories do so correctly. Finally, the third premise
directs our attention to the fact that our behavior is correlated with the
qualitative mental states we have. For example, if I want to drink some
water, I pick up a glass of water, not a glass of wine. Even the epiphenomenalist would not deny a correlation of this kind. Of course, there may be
cases in which such correlation does not hold, but, as a rule, it holds.
As far as I can see, these premises are independent of each other. And,
let me repeat, I am sure that they would hardly give rise to controversy.
It is interesting, however, that combining them leads to the refutation of
epiphenomenalism and provides a strong case for interactionism. Indeed,
if identical events can (in the sense of real, or “natural,” possibility, and
not just of logical possibility) have quite different causes, and if my brain
at a given moment of time can be considered as a sum of neural events
(all or at least some of which could have had different causes), then it is
obvious that its current complex state could have been a result of very
different trains of events, very different causal trajectories. But in such a
case I would have had a different individual history, and, according to the
second premise, other memories, than I actually have. And the contents of
our memories are the source of intentional objects (which are qualitative
in their nature) of other mental states, like beliefs and desires. Meanwhile,
the third premise tells us that our desires and other mental states are correlated with our behavior. Hence, if my current physical state had been the
result of a different train of events, providing me with different memories,
desires and so on, then, while being (currently) the same physically as I actually am, I would behave differently. And the differences in my behavior
would depend on the fact that I would have different mental states. And
if this is so, we must admit that my actual behavior also crucially depends
on the mental states I currently have. And that fact means that our qualitative mental states have a real impact on our behavior.
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When I discussed this argument with some colleagues, they proposed
a few objections, which I am going to survey here. Some said that while all
the premises are correct, the conclusion may not follow in case of a Putnam-like externalist scenario. Indeed, it is possible to have had a different
individual history simply due to some differences in environment, for example. And such differences could be undetectable at the qualitative level
of our memories. Then I could have had a different past than I actually
have, but still I would have the very same memories. I think this is really
possible, but this fact does not affect my argument, because such scenarios
do not exclude other scenarios where the differences are detectable at the
level of perceptions and memories. Such scenarios are also possible, and
that is all that I need for my conclusion.
Another objection17 draws our attention to the fact that, according to
my argument, my present mental states depend not only on the physical
state of my brain, but also on my past experiences. The worry is that such
dependence may involve some kind of a “causal action at a temporal distance,” that is, from the past to present, which is hard to swallow. I think,
however, that in reality we have no serious reasons to worry. First of all,
not every dependence is a causal one. There is such a thing as logical dependence, for instance, and our case can give an example of it. But, what is
even more important, we will see that in fact we have no need to deny the
supervenience principle at all, that is, we have no need to deny the strict
dependence of my present mental states on physical states (only after denying the supervenience principle would we have a need for additional
causation). All we need to deny is the local supervenience principle, but
this can leave intact the global supervenience principle (I will discuss this
later). Of course, such denial can shock somebody and maybe is also hard
to swallow, but that is what my argument is about. And a priori it is difficult to understand why the local supervenience principle (same brain–
same qualia) is more solid that the reverse principle (same qualia–same
brain) which is universally denied since the coming of functionalism. We
simply have to reject some philosophical superstitions.
The only way to criticize my argument, I think, is to attack its premises. But as these premises are universally accepted, the burden of proof
is on those who want to attack them. And it hardly helps to say that all
these premises express theses that allow exclusions, and that scenarios
I describe presuppose the very same exclusions. It hardly helps because
this thesis is also to be proved, and I see no clear ways to prove it.
3
So, if the arguments above are correct, epiphenomenalism is wrong, and
we should accept interactionism. And then “the hard problem of consciousness” mentioned at the beginning of this paper could have the answer that I sketched above: brain activity is accompanied by subjective
17

Made by Richard Swinburne.
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experience because without such accompaniment our brains, being the
same physically, simply could not work as they usually work, and that’s
because our mental states do indeed affect our behavior.
But now it is time to think about the cost of this answer. If we admit
that mental states have an influence on brain processes, we are in danger
of destroying the causal closure principle, that is, the principle according
to which every physical event has an immediate physical cause.18 But why
should we be so worried about violation of this principle?
I see at least two reasons to worry. First of all, as I have already mentioned, some philosophers believe that the renunciation of this principle
leads to the demolition of the very basis of experimental physics. Secondly, it is rather difficult to deny this principle, as it may be ranked among
the fundamental natural beliefs that guide us in our ordinary life.
The first of these reasons is not, I think, very dangerous. For example,
David Papineau has shown that until the twentieth century experimental
physics did not in fact presuppose the causal closure principle.19 Papineau
is probably right that in the twentieth century this principle became more
significant for scientists and philosophers. It is clear, however, that the
core of contemporary physics is quantum mechanics, and the relation of
quantum mechanics to that principle is notoriously ambiguous, as some
interpretations of quantum mechanics allow for the crucial role of the conscious observer in the collapse of the wave function.
The second reason to worry seems to me much more serious. I think
that our belief in causal closure can be counted among our natural beliefs.
Admitttedly, this is far from obvious, and in fact is not a commonplace
opinion. Still, we can try to prove it by connecting the causal closure principle with one or another natural belief, such as our belief in the correspondence between the past and the future experiences. To demonstrate
this connection we should do some kind of phenomenological analysis. In
outline, this analysis looks as follows. As Hume has shown, our reasonings about facts are based on inferences from the past to the future. Such
inferences presuppose our belief in the correspondence or “conformity between the future and the past.” Looking closely at this belief, we see that it
implicitly incorporates the causal closure principle. Indeed, let us suppose
that it is possible to infer from the past to the future and deny the causal
closure principle at the same time. If this principle is denied we should be
ready to accept that there could be situations in which an external physical
event B could have no physical correlate (necessarily connected with it) in
the previous moment of time. Then, if that previous event A is repeated,
we would have no reasons to believe that it will be succeeded by the event
B. Note that we could not rely on possible mental causes of B included in
A, as they are not among our experiences (and, as we saw in the previous
18
Cf. E. J. Lowe, “Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism,” Philosophy 75 (2000), pp.
571–585.
19
D. Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
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section, we cannot infer to them from the physical characteristics of event
A). And, lacking such beliefs, we would not be able to infer from the past
to the future. It follows that our belief in the conformity between the future and the past includes belief in the causal closure principle, when we
think about physical processes outside our body. And if our belief in the
conformity between the future and the past leads us to conclude that the
behavior of other people is determined by physical causes, it is reasonable
to generalize this conclusion to ourselves. So it is better not to deny the
causal closure principle.
I understand, of course, that this brief argument needs to be developed
in more detail. But that is not my purpose here. All I want to do is to indicate a possible line of argumentation for the causal closure principle.
For the purposes of this paper it suffices to stipulate that this principle is
true (and most philosophers would agree with that) and see what happens
next. So let us assume that we have no choice but to accept causal closure.
4
Can we reconcile the causal closure principle with the thesis that mental
states have an impact on behavior? In order to find an answer to this question let us return to the proof of the causal efficacy of mental states. We
saw that we can infer such efficacy on the basis of the assumption that
one and the same brain could be accompanied by different sets of mental
states, if we assume also the correlation between mental states and behavior. Combining these assumptions gives us the following conclusion: if I
consider my brain, then an answer to the question “Why does my brain
produce the behavior it produces?” is impossible without taking into account the particular mental states I have: I could have other mental states,
and then my brain would produce quite a different behavior. Looking into
this argument, we see that it presupposes an important qualification, expressed in the phrase “if I consider my brain, etc.” That is, we can prove
the efficacy of mental states by the local consideration of a material system
we are interested in. In other words, up until now, we have talked about
local interactionism only.
This is an important qualification, and if we free ourselves from it and
consider my brain in the context of the whole universe, the picture may
change drastically. Indeed, couldn’t we assume in such a case that my behavior is determined by physical causes after all, only not just by local
physical factors in the brain but also by non-local physical factors as well?
This assumption could help us to save the causal closure principle.
It is clear that this also is not a solution without costs. Apart from allowing a notion of non-local causality, we again face the question about the
role of mental states in producing brain activity: are they epiphenomenal
after all?
Before answering this question, I should mention that the solution we
are now considering has some obvious merits as well. Most importantly, it
can help to save the lawlike relation between the physical and the mental.
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When I argued that local interactionism is true, we came to the conclusion that one and the same brain could be accompanied by quite different
mental states.20 As I have already mentioned, this conclusion contradicts
the local supervenience principle, which establishes an univocal correspondence between the brain and its qualitative mental states. And if the
local supervenience principle is wrong, we might doubt whether there exists any lawlike connection between mental states and the brain. The only
chance to save such a relation is to show that while the local supervenience
principle does not work, this might not affect the global supervenience
principle, according to which identical physical worlds are accompanied
by the same mental states.21 Indeed, from the denial of the local supervenience principle it doesn’t follow that the global supervenience principle
is also to be denied. For if the global supervenience principle is true, then
the falsity of the local supervenience principle means no more than that
if my brain were accompanied by a different set of mental states, then the
physical world as a whole would not be the same as it is now: there would
be some differences in it.
Now it is possible to combine this picture with the causal closure principle. Suppose that non-local (as regards my brain) physical differences
of a world in which my brain occurs are accompanied by a different set
(compared to the actual world) of mental states that are correlated with
a different behavior. Then these non-local physical differences might be
considered to be a non-local physical part of the cause of such different
behavior. And, correspondingly, the physical differences of the actual
world—in comparison with the physical features of that possible world—
might be considered to be a non-local physical part of the cause of my behavior in the actual world. Hence, accepting the causal closure principle in
combination with local interactionism, we get a confirmation of the global
supervenience principle, which in turn can provide us with a reason to
believe in the lawlike connection between mental states and their physical bases. It is only that the physical bases now extend beyond the local,
physical features of my brain itself.
5
The possibility of such a lawlike connection gives us hope that it will
be possible to find a new answer (since, if we believe in causal closure,
the straightforward interactionistic answer is wrong) to Chalmers’s question: Why is my brain activity accompanied by subjective experience? In
order to see how this new answer arises, note that the above discussion
raises the following problem: if we retain the causal closure principle and
20
J. C. Fisher, “Why Nothing Mental is Just in the Head,” Nous 41 (2007), pp. 318–334
comes to a similar conclusion, using different arguments and thought experiments. I have
published some of my results in V. Vasilyev, “Brain and Consciousness: Exits from the Labyrinth,” Social Sciences 37 (2006), pp. 51–66.
21
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introduce, in the way that we have above, the idea of non-local physical
factors in the causation of our behavior, then we may get the impression
that our mental states are epiphenomenal after all. And it is hard to explain the existence of epiphenomenal mental states.
However, this problem can be solved. Our situation here is in fact totally different from the one in which we usually talk about epiphenomenalism. If our behavior could be explained by local physical processes in
the brain, the existence of mental states would be miraculous. But if we
have already proved that our mental states make a difference at the local
physical level, and if we then assume that their physical effects still could
have had some physical, although non-local, correlates, then we might
be inclined to think that it is these non-local correlates that are a kind of
epiphenomena. The reason is simple: in general, we have no empirical evidence to believe in non-local causation. But if we want to insist that these
non-local correlates are real causes, then, it seems, we should accept the
following schema: as non-local causality is not universal, it is not unconditional; and so it is quite plausible that the condition under which a nonlocal physical correlate might be considered as a cause (or as a component
of a complex cause) of some event is precisely the very existence of private
mental states accompanying this event within some physical system and
correlating with it. In other words, mental states seem to be something
like mediators in the realization of non-local physical causation. They are
such mediators not in the sense that they are intermediary links between
the non-local factors and behavior (this would violate the causal closure
principle) but in the sense that they are necessary ontological conditions
of the realization of non-local physical causation.22 In such a case the mental states would not be epiphenomenal; they would have causal relevance,
if not causal efficacy.
If this is the right way to go, then not only can we explain why our
brain activity is accompanied by subjective experience, but we can also
begin to try explaining how that accompaniment is possible. (Recall that
the full version of Chalmers’s question includes a request for how it is that
brain activity is accompanied by consciousness.) Indeed, since it is very
likely that our mental states emerge from brain activity, and if we then
take into account that these states must be ontological conditions of nonlocal physical causation, we can suppose that they are produced by physical systems, which would demonstrate some kind of non-deterministic
behavior in the physical systems themselves if we ignore the role of the
mental states in the realization of the non-local physical causation. In other words, the mechanisms due to which some physical systems produce
mental states must have a relation to the incompleteness, at the physical level, of their local causal patterns. I should note, however, that this
scheme does not mean that the existence of mental states is just an odd
22
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consequence of some physical anomaly. In fact, we saw (see section 2 of
the present paper) that the existence of mental states connected with some
physical systems provides such systems with an opportunity to take account of their individual histories;23 and that fact, in turn, can give them a
big adaptive advantage.
So our return to the hard problem of consciousness and its possible
solution helps us to see that the approach of David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind is probably the most fruitful one after all. Let me recall that in
that book he considers a solution of the hard problem based on the thesis
that mental states are ontological conditions of the realization of physical
causation and even of the very existence of physical properties. At the
beginning of this paper I said that this idea is rather bizarre. But it looks
bizarre only while we use it in the context of a neo-Russellian ontological
scheme (in which mental states are something like vehicles of physical
properties), as Chalmers did. And from the arguments above, it follows
that after some modifications in that scheme this approach may open the
way to solving the hard problem. As Ned Block has noticed, to solve the
hard problem is to close an “explanatory gap.”24 It is interesting, however,
that Block, as well as J. Levine,25 believe there is no difference in explanatory gaps when we try to understand why subjective experience exists and
when we try to understand why we have just this subjective experience.
But while we certainly cannot find an answer to the second question yet,
we are in a much more promising situation in regard to the first one.26
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